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Abstract In a recent paper, Hennessy and Moschini (American Journal of Agricul-
tural Economics 88(2): 308–323, 2006) analyse the interactions between scientific
uncertainty and costly regulatory actions. We use their model to analyse the costs of
making type I and type II errors, in the context of the possible introduction of GM
crops. We demonstrate that the costs of making a type I or type II error should be
calculated as the difference in costs between choosing the right action immediately
and choosing the right action only after the state of nature has been revealed. The
importance of this result for the discussion on the precautionary principle is briefly
examined.
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1 Introduction
The introduction of genetically modified (GM) crops has raised concerns about
the implications for biodiversity and ecosystems in many countries (Hails 2002;
Ervin and Welsh 2005). Once GM crops are introduced, gene flow and non-target
effects may yield irreversible costs to society. One of the objectives of regulatory
bodies such as the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) is to assess the likelihood
of such a scenario. To analyse the trade-off between (irreversible) costs and benefits
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of a regulation on GM crops, both uncertainty and irreversibility have to be explicitly
taken into account. Under uncertainty and irreversibility, the costs of making an ini-
tially incorrect decision may be high. Such an incorrect decision can be prevented by
delaying the decision until additional information has arrived. This delay, however,
comes at a cost too.
In a recent article in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Hennessy
and Moschini (2006) (from here on referred to as HM) analyse the interactions be-
tween scientific uncertainty and costly regulatory actions. The setting of their article
is a regulator having to decide whether to ban a certain practice or technology when
there is uncertainty on its possible damage (for instance GM crops). Their main re-
sults are: the presence of adjustments costs “creates inertia and favours the status
quo” and adjustment costs “change how the optimal regulation responds to better
scientific information”. Their paper makes an important theoretical contribution to
the assessment of additional information to decision-making about regulatory poli-
cies. While the importance of new information is their major contribution, HM also
suggest that the specification of their model allows to quantify the type I and type II
errors within the decision-making process. The objective of this paper is to provide a
specification of type I and type II errors in the HM model and discuss its importance.
2 Model
HM set up a model where a regulator faces the choice between banning and not
banning at time t = 0. With probability q , the practice causes damage and with prob-
ability 1 − q it does not. κ ∈ (0,∞) is the date at which uncertainty is resolved; it
follows from the exponential distribution f (κ) = he−hκ , with E(κ) = 1/h, where h
is the hazard rate.1 There are three types of costs related to the implementation of a
ban: adjustment costs δ1 are the costs of implementing the ban, adjustment costs δ2
are the costs of reversing the ban (if necessary), and C is an annual cost that lasts as
long as the ban is in place. R(a, s, κ) denotes the realized total costs to the regulator,
where at ∈ {B,N} is the action chosen at time t (Ban or No ban), and s ∈ {T ,F } is
the state of nature (True or False that the practice causes damage). When the ban is in
place and the practice indeed causes damage, annual damage D is avoided. All costs
and benefits are discounted using the continuous-time discount rate r .
Implicit in HM is the definition of the H0 and H1 hypotheses:
H0: The state of nature is T ; the regulator should ban (given the correct assumption
by HM that D > C + δ1r);
H1: The state of nature is F ; the regulator should not ban.
Notice that this specification of the H0 and H1 hypotheses is somewhat counter-
intuitive. The conventional assumption is that H0 represents the state of nature with-
out damage. For completeness, recall the definitions of type I and type II errors:
1 The exponential distribution has a couple of attractive features for models with arrival of information; an
important feature is that it allows analytical tractability of the model.
Quantifying type I and type II errors in decision-making 63
Type I error: The error of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually true; i.e.
not banning when the regulator should have;
Type II error: The error of accepting the null-hypothesis when it is actually false; i.e.
banning when the regulator should not have.
HM calculate the costs of a type I error (ZIHM ) as the ex ante expected total costs
of not banning, and the costs of a type II error (ZIIHM ) as the ex ante expected total
costs of banning. This is most easily illustrated using their baseline model without
intermediate arrival of information, while the same holds for their three period-model
with gradual resolution of uncertainty:
ZIHM = E
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where E is the expectation operator.
This specification of the costs of making type I and type II errors does not con-
sider the benefits of arrival of new information. We choose to explicitly consider
these benefits; thereby following the literature on decision-making under uncertainty
and irreversibility to which HM contribute (cf. Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Given the
definitions of the H0 and H1 hypotheses introduced above, we therefore propose to
calculate the costs of making a type I or type II error as the difference in costs be-
tween choosing the right action immediately and choosing the right action only after
the state of nature has been revealed. This implies that the cost of making a type I
error (ZIAW ) is the difference in costs between immediate banning (a0 = aκ = B) and
delayed banning (a0 = N and aκ = B), given that the state of nature is T . Similarly,
the cost of making a type II error (ZIIAW ) is the difference in costs between immediate
not banning (a0 = aκ = N ) and delayed not banning (a0 = B and aκ = N ), given that
the state of nature is F :
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ZIAW = E
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Obviously, because we use the HM model to construct our specification, we depend
on their distributional assumption for κ , see footnote 1.
Comparing the size of errors calculated by HM and by us (AW) we derive that:
ZIHM ≷ ZIAW ⇔ q ≷
Dr − Cr − δ1r2
Dr + Ch + δ1hr
ZIIHM ≷ ZIIAW ⇔ C ≷ δ2r
Compared with the AW specification, the HM specification results in higher costs
of making a type I error if q is large and vice versa. For type II errors, the HM
specification results in higher costs as long as C > δ2r , and the difference is larger
when q is higher. It is reasonable to assume that C > δ2r , because this assures that,
when a0 = B and s = F , the adjustment costs δ2 do not prevent the adjustment to
aκ = N . Compared with the AW specification, for the relevant parameter values, the
HM specification results in higher costs of making a type II error. The AW specifica-
tion is therefore more conservative, and more so for larger values of q .
An important difference between the two specifications is that the AW specifi-
cation of type I and type II errors is independent of q , the probability that damage
occurs.2 This makes sense, as the costs and the probability of making an error are
two distinct notions. When q increases, this should not affect the costs of an incorrect
decision. It should, however, affect the expected costs of making type I and type II
errors, calculated as costs times probability. Hence, the HM specification is unneces-
sarily sensitive to q .
2Thanks to an anonymous reviewer who pointed out this difference.
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3 Discussion
The HM specification results in higher costs of not banning when the regulator should
have (type I error), if q , the probability that damage occurs, is large, and vice versa.
For banning when the regulator should not have (type II error), the HM specification
always results in higher costs for relevant parameter values.
To our knowledge this is the first attempt at specifying the costs of making type I
or type II errors in a model of decision-making under uncertainty and irreversibility.
A topic of utmost importance for decision-making with respect to the introduction of
GM crops (Wesseler et al. 2007). The importance of appropriately specifying errors
in this type of models is apparent for two reasons. First, from an economic point
of view, it is important to know the costs and probabilities of making type I and
type II errors in order to calculate the expected costs of making an error.3 A regulator
may introduce a threshold value for the expected costs of making a type I or type II
error in his decision-making. Within the debate about bio-safety and food safety,
the economic specification allows to compare the costs of additional tests with the
changes in costs of making either the type I or type II error.
Second, it is important as an input for the application of the precautionary principle
(cf. Gollier and Treich 2003). The precautionary principle has gained increasing im-
portance in policy-making; it has for instance been adopted by the EU on the issue of
releasing GM crops. One interpretation of the precautionary principle is the reversing
of the burden of proof (van den Belt 2003). In the context of this model this inter-
pretation implies that the probability of making a type I error should be minimized
(Ervin and Welsh 2005).4 Clearly, a proper understanding of the specification of the
costs of type I errors is a prerequisite for a sound use (or disuse) of the precautionary
principle.
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